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Abstract  
Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for 
decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may 
leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible 
for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The 
present article investigates the putative relationship between risk-taking and responsibility by 
drawing a distinction between being responsible for the outcome (R1) vs. acting responsibly 
(R2). Four experiments were performed, in which participants were presented with scenarios 
describing decision makers facing a choice between a risky (uncertain) and a riskless (certain) 
option, framed in terms of losses or equivalent gains. The results showed that decision makers 
who chose the risky alternative were judged to have acted in a less responsible manner (R2), 
while still being held equally responsible for the outcome (R1), unless they were ignorant of 
the risks involved. Choosing risk did not absolve decisions makers from blame, despite being 
less causal and less in control than those who chose the riskless option. Risky decision makers 
were also judged to be more personally involved. The dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings 
confirms earlier findings and serves to clarify an alleged relationship between risky choices 
and responsibility aversion. Framing effects for own choices were found in both scenarios. In 
contrast, responsibility ratings were only slightly affected by frame. 
 
Key words:  Outcome responsibility; Act responsibly; risky choice; framing; uncertainty; 
decisions 
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Better safe than sorry: Risking irresponsibility by seeking uncertainty 
 
In a variety of professional roles, and in their private lives, people find themselves in 
situations in which at least one of their options is fraught with uncertainty. For example, 
should a private equity broker invest the client’s money in a fluctuating stock market with 
possible high gains, but also potential high losses; or keep the money in a low risk, low yield 
fund? Should the health authorities in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) famous Asian Disease 
(AD) problem choose the “certain outcome” program, saving 200 lives for sure; or the “risky” 
program, where best case could save all 600, but in the worst case save none? The present 
paper investigates how people judge the decision maker’s responsibility in choices between 
risky options and certain options. We do so by drawing a distinction between being personally 
responsible for the outcome (R1) vs. acting responsibly (R2).  
Responsible for outcome vs. acting responsibly 
Debates about responsibility are not limited to assessing the causal contributions of the 
actors involved and who should be praised or blamed for more or less successful outcomes, 
but also include whether a decision maker has acted in a morally responsible way. We claim 
that such moral judgments are central for allocating responsibility, although largely 
overlooked in attribution research. Nordbye and Teigen (2014a) distinguished between two 
central aspects of the responsibility concept: R1 – being personally responsible for a decision 
or its consequences, and R2 – acting responsibly. The R1 sense of responsibility is related to 
the causal and the classical attribution way of looking at responsibility, or in other words, 
being personally responsible for the outcome. Acting responsibly (R2), on the other hand, 
reflect cultural expectancies, morality, duties and obligations, and are linked to social and 
professional roles (Cane, 2002; Hamilton & Hagiwara, 1992; Hart, 2008; Vincent, 2011). A 
highly responsible decision maker is assumed to perform careful, well-balanced decisions, 
without inflicting avoidable harm, which is a general value in our society. Social values 
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theory states that the social value of risk (or rather to avoid risk) is a major determinant of 
decisions we make for others (Stone, Choi, de Bruin, & Mandel, 2013), and could also guide 
the moral evaluation of the decision maker in risky choice dilemmas. Risky decisions involve, 
by definition, a venture into the unknown with less control over the outcomes, including 
potentially damaging ones, which could be incompatible with acting in a responsible way. 
Nordbye and Teigen (2014a, Exp.2) accordingly found that high risk-takers were viewed as 
acting in a less responsible manner than low risk-takers (R2). They were at the same time 
deemed as having higher outcome responsibility (R1). However, the risks in these previous 
studies were not quantified in terms of probabilities and expected outcomes. Hence it remains 
to be seen if risk-takers are still judged as behaving less responsibly (R2) while carrying more 
outcome responsibility (R1) in cases where the expected utilities of both decisions can be 
compared. Decisions between certain and risky options have been shown to be influenced by 
framing, where people usually prefer the certain option in a save frame and prefer the risky 
option in the loss frame (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The present paper will therefore 
investigate responsibility judgments within both frames, though the main aim is to compare 
the effect of risky and riskless choices (regardless of frame) upon R1 and R2 judgments. 
Responsibility and risk   
It has recently been argued that decision makers may choose an uncertain option, not 
because of loss aversion, as suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), but 
because of responsibility aversion (Leonhardt, Keller, & Pechmann, 2011; Tykocinski, Amir, 
& Ayal, 2016).  
To be fully responsible for an event, a person needs to have caused the event to 
happen, been in control of the outcome, been able to foresee the consequences, and have had 
an intention of the outcome to happen (Alicke, 2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Malle, 
Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Shaver, 1985). It follows that an actor carries more 
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responsibility the more he or she can be seen as an active contributor to the results (Cane, 
2002; Chockler & Halpern, 2004; Lagnado, Gerstenberg, & Zultan, 2013; Weiner, 1995). 
Conversely, the more situational (external) determinants for the action, the less the actor can 
be held responsible. In line with this, Leonhardt et al. (2011) proposed that risk-seeking 
behavior could be a strategy for evading responsibility. In several experiments, the first of 
them using the AD paradigm, participants were asked how they would feel about the 
outcomes of a certain or an uncertain option. The results indicated that participants felt less 
accountable, less guilty, and less blameworthy for the uncertain (risky) options, perhaps 
because these involved an intervention of chance factors or other agents with which one could 
share the responsibility. In a more recent set of studies, Tykocinski et al. (2016) found risky 
choice framing effects only in situations where the actors were perceived to be highly 
responsible. They argue that such actors want to reduce their responsibility for losses but not 
for gains, which makes them prefer the “risky” option in a loss frame. By allowing chance 
factors to play a role in generating the final outcome, the actor appears less blameworthy, 
according to this account. Thus, the preference for the risky option may be seen as an 
impression management strategy to attenuate responsibility and blame.   
However, other research has shown that people are often reluctant to accept 
randomizers (e.g., coin-flipping) as a decision aid, even in choices between equivalent options, 
partly because it is perceived as an improper evasion of responsibility (Keren & Teigen, 2010). 
Nordbye and Teigen (2014a) found that risk-taking actors were considered more responsible 
for their decisions than actors choosing alternatives with less risk. Moreover, if a risk-taking 
actor could have made a different decision (namely chosen the riskless alternative), he or she 
can be held responsible for making the risky choice itself, if not for its actual consequences. 
Such an actor could be made responsible for leaving the outcome to chance, and being blamed 
for behaving in a negligent way.  
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The present studies 
The aim of the present studies was to investigate assessments of R1 and R2 for risk-
averse and risk-seeking decision makers. Leonhardt et al. (2011) and Tykocinski et al. (2016) 
suggested that choice of the risky (uncertain) alternative reduces responsibility; however, 
these authors did not distinguish between outcome responsibility (R1) and behaving in a 
responsible way (R2). Moreover, Leonhardt et al. (2011) did not examine framing effects, as 
they only asked about feelings and uncertainty preferences in a loss frame where most people 
prefer the risky option. Tykocinski et al. (2016) studied the effects of high and low imagined 
responsibility on risky choice, rather than the other way around. Thus, personal responsibility 
was in their studies introduced as an independent variable rather than a consequence of 
choosing the risky or the riskless option. In contrast, we designed the present studies to 
examine how risky and riskless choices affect judgments of responsibility, both for losses and 
for gains. Further, we believe that knowledge of potential consequences (which are available 
even for the risky option) will give decision makers outcome responsibility, even for 
outcomes that are uncontrollable and not intended, when the risky choice is an informed and 
deliberate choice. We thus predicted that choosing the risky alternative will not excuse the 
decision maker from outcome responsibility (R1) when consequences are known. Moreover, 
if risk-taking is not considered the proper thing to do (Nordbye & Teigen, 2014a), we 
expected that selecting the risky option would be considered a less responsible choice (R2) 
than selecting the “certain” option. We accordingly predict R1 and R2 ratings to diverge. 
The R1-R2 distinction is further elaborated by assessing the relationship between R1 
judgments with judgments of agency, operationalized as ratings of involvement (Experiment 
1 and 2) and ratings of causal contribution (Experiments 3 and 4). R2 judgments are related to 
judgments of morality, operationalized as ratings of acceptability (measured in Experiments 3 
and 4) and (inversely) as ratings of blameworthiness (measured in Experiments 1, 2, and 3). 
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As our hypotheses diverge from those proposed by Leonhardt et al. (2011) and Tykocinski et 
al. (2016) we deemed that several, mutually consistent studies would be needed to establish 
an alternative interpretation of the role of responsibility in risky choice. 
Participants in all experiments were told about one decision-maker who preferred the 
certain option and another who preferred the risky choice. Experiment 1 used a vaccination 
scenario involving saving vs. losing lives. One group made R1 judgments and another group 
made R2 judgments, to avoid the two questions being answered differently for pragmatic 
reasons (Schwarz, 1999). To increase the generality of the results, Experiment 2 described a 
financial scenario, as some studies have found weaker framing effects for financial problems 
(Druckman & McDermott, 2008; Fagley & Miller, 1997; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 
& Perner, 1999; Wang, 1996). As responsibility judgments can be influenced in hindsight by 
outcome quality and outcome severity (Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004; Robbennolt, 2000; 
Walster, 1966), Experiment 2 explored three outcome conditions: no outcome, positive 
outcome or negative outcome. Experiment 3 included both scenarios (within-Ss), allowing for 
direct comparisons between responsibility judgments in both domains. We predict that life 
and death situations will lead to more risk seeking choices, but that this preference might not 
reduce responsibility ratings. In Experiment 4 we investigated the difference between 
informed and uninformed decision makers, where the latter run the same risks without 
deliberately choosing them. This comparison might reveal whether outcome responsibility can 
be reduced more by risk ignorance (uninformed decisions) than by risk-taking (informed 
decisions). 
 Thus, all experiments can be regarded as variations over the same theme, similar 
enough to serve as replication studies, and yet with differences that control for potential 
effects of design, scenarios and rating scales, to establish the robustness of the main findings. 
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Experiment 1: Saving and losing lives 
Experiment 1 used a risky choice scenario modelled after Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1981) original AD framing experiment, except that the 200 and 400 lives at peril belonged to 
two different risk groups, to make sure that “200 lives lost” or “400 lives saved” would not be 
interpreted as “200 [400] and perhaps more” (Kühberger, 1995; Mandel, 2014, 2015). One 
condition was positively framed in terms of lives saved, the other negatively framed in terms 
of lives lost. Participants were told about different choices made by the health authorities in 
two hypothetical countries, and asked to either evaluate how responsible the decision makers 
were for the outcomes (R1 ratings), or how responsibly they had acted (R2 ratings). We 
expected that the decision maker who preferred the certain option would be regarded as acting 
in a more responsible way (R2), without being regarded as more responsible (R1) for the 
outcome.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 148 undergraduate students from the University of 
Tromsø, Norway, participated in the study (77.7% women, median age 21 years). 
Participation was voluntary and unpaid. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions, according to a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with framing (lives saved vs. lost) 
and type of responsibility (R1 vs. R2 ratings) as the two factors.  
Procedure and material. All participants received the following vaccination scenario in 
either the save or loss frame: 
Imagine that two equally large countries are preparing for a new outburst of swine flu. 
This time two types of the virus exist: H1N1 and H1N2. Of these, H1N2 is more 
dangerous and is expected to kill 400 people, while H1N1 is expected to kill 200 
people. The health authorities have a choice between to vaccines. 
 
Vaccine A has an effect on H1N1, but not on H1N2. With this vaccination program 200 
[400] people will be saved [die].  
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Vaccine B has a 1/3 probability to have an effect on both viruses. With this vaccination 
program there is a 1/3 chance of saving 600 people [no one will die], and a 2/3 chance 
that no one [600] will be saved [die]. 
 
Then, participants were asked which of the options they preferred. They were then told 
about the ministers of health in the two countries, one of which chose vaccination program A 
and the other vaccination program B. Subsequently, half of them were asked to rate both 
ministers of health for outcome responsibility (R1 ratings), whereas the other half rated which 
of the two ministers of health that had acted in the most responsible way (R2 ratings). Finally, 
all participants rated how personally involved and how blameworthy the two actors appeared 
to be. All ratings were performed on scales from 1 to 7.  
Results 
Preferences. Personal preferences were affected by frame, indicative of the framing 
manipulation being successful. In the positively framed “lives saved” condition, 53% 
preferred the certain option, whereas in the “lives lost” frame the certain option was chosen 
by only 25%, 2(1, N = 147) = 10.52, p < .001. 
Responsibility (R1) and involvement. Decision makers choosing the risky and the 
certain option were rated about equally responsible for the outcome, as indicated by the R1 
ratings in Table 1. A mixed ANOVA of involvement ratings showed that the risk-taking 
minister was viewed as more personally involved than his risk-averse colleague, F(1, 145) = 
16.13, p <.001, ηp
2
= .10, but there was no interaction between frame and choice,  F(1, 145) = 
1.31, p = .254, ηp
2
= .009.  There were positive correlations between R1 judgements and 
involvement, which reached significance for the risky option, r(60) = 0.35, p = 0.006, but not 
for the certain option, r(59) = 0.25, p = 0.055.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
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Responsible behavior (R2) and blame. The risk-taking minister of health was viewed 
as making a less responsible (R2) decision. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with frame (save vs. 
loss), own preference (certain vs. risky), and choice of the two health ministers (certain vs. 
risky) on R2 ratings, showed a main effect of choice, F(1, 82) = 16.64, p < .001, ηp
2
= .17. 
There was also a significant interaction between own preference and the health minister’s 
choice, F(1, 62.34) = 38.33, p < .001, ηp
2
= .32.
 
The effect of own preference on R2 ratings is 
mainly driven by participants preferring the certain option and deeming the risky option to be 
particularly irresponsible (Mcertain = 5.44 vs. Mrisky = 3.16, t(31) = 7.55, p < .001, d = 1.34). 
Participants preferring the risky option rated the two options more similarly (Mcertain = 4.21 vs. 
Mrisky = 4.68, t(53) = -1.86, p = .069, d = -0.25).  
The expected negative correlations were found for R2 and blameworthiness, but again 
it was only significant for the risky option, r(84)  = -0.39, p < 0.001, not for the certain option, 
r(84) = -0.20, p = 0.063. Participants who themselves preferred the certain option deemed the 
risky option to be particularly blameworthy, and vice versa, F(1, 144) = 17.87, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .11.   
Discussion  
 Decision makers choosing the certain option were, as expected, perceived as acting in 
a more responsible way. Thus, R2 judgments reflect people’s ideas of “doing the right thing” 
(Anderson, 1995). This was particularly true for those who themselves preferred the certain 
option, who deemed the risky choice both more irresponsible and blameworthy. Despite 
leaving more of the outcome to chance, risk-seeking decision makers were viewed as more 
personally involved, possibly reflecting a heightened sense of agency by making a norm 
violating choice (Kirkebøen & Nordbye, 2015; Nichols, 2002). Perhaps because of these 
apparently conflicting features, decision makers who favored the risky options were not seen 
as less personally responsible (R1) for the outcome than their risk-averse colleagues. In the 
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positive frame (not studied by Leonhardt et al.) they were seen to have acted in a less 
responsible (R2) way.  
Experiment 2 – Saving and losing money 
 
Experiment 2 explored within-Ss ratings of R1 and R2 in a financial context (adapted 
from Teigen & Nikolaisen, 2009). Leonhardt et al. (2011) used a framing task without 
disclosing the outcome of the risky choice. Participants may therefore have believed that the 
outcome of the risky choice was positive and that no one died. Responsibility judgments in 
real life are often performed retrospectively, after the outcome is known. Prior studies of post-
outcome responsibility have found responsibility judgments to be influenced in hindsight by 
outcome quality and outcome severity. When the consequences are more severe, 
responsibility increases (Robbennolt, 2000; Walster, 1966). Negative outcomes make the 
actor appear more blameworthy (Mazzocco et al., 2004). Participants in Experiment 2 were 
asked to make their evaluations either in a pre-outcome condition or in one successful and one 
unsuccessful post-outcome condition. 
Method 
Participants. A total of 207 undergraduate students at the University of Oslo 
participated (68% women, median age 22 years) voluntary and unpaid. Participants were 
assigned to one of six conditions following a 2 x 3 design, with framing (money saved vs. 
money lost) and outcome (no outcome vs. positive vs. negative outcome) as a between-Ss 
factor.   
Material and procedure. All participants received the following scenario, with the 
strategies described in either a save or loss framed version. 
Imagine that Per and Paul have each invested NOK 600,000 ($100,000) in a company 
that is now threatened by bankruptcy. Both Per’s and Paul’s investments include a 
large shareholding of NOK 400,000 and a smaller shareholding of NOK 200,000. A 
financial advisor concludes that there are two possible ways of handling the situation.  
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Strategy A: This strategy entails saving [losing] the smaller shareholding (save NOK 
200,000 for sure [lose NOK 400,000]). 
Strategy B: This strategy gives 1/3 chance of saving both shareholdings [no loss] (save 
[not lose] NOK 600,000) and 2/3 chance of not saving anything [losing both 
shareholdings].
1
 
 
Participants in the pre-outcome (no outcome) condition were asked which strategy 
they themselves would have chosen. They were then told that one of the actors (Per) chose the 
certain outcome option and the other (Paul) the uncertain option, and asked to rate on 1-7 
rating scales, for each actor, how responsible are the two actors for the outcome (R1 ratings), 
how personally involved do you believe they feel, how responsibly did they act (R2 ratings), 
and how blameworthy they were for their actions.   
Participants in the post-outcome conditions were not asked which option they favored 
(this would make little sense after the outcomes were disclosed). Instead they were informed 
about the outcomes of Per and Paul’s choices. The risk-taking decision maker was successful 
in the positive outcome condition, and failed in the negative outcome condition, whereas Per 
achieved the expected outcome in both conditions. Subsequently, both actors were rated for 
responsibility (R1 and R2), involvement, and blameworthiness, as in the no-outcome 
condition. 
Results 
Preferences. In the pre-outcome conditions 77.1% preferred the certain choice in the 
save frame, compared 55.6% in the loss frame, 2(1, N = 71) = 3.70, p = .055. Thus, strategy 
preferences were again influenced by the way the options are framed, but both groups were 
more risk-averse than in the life and death scenario of Experiment 1.  
                                                 
1
 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that this scenario is unrealistic, as bankruptcy will affect the value of all 
shares to the same extent. However, our less knowledgeable participants never questioned the two fictitious 
strategies.  
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<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Responsibility (R1) and involvement. Participants in the pre-outcome condition gave 
the risk-taker higher outcome responsibility. A 2x2x2 Mixed ANOVA on R1 ratings, using 
frame (save vs. loss), and outcome (no outcome vs. known outcome) as between-Ss factors, 
and choice (certain vs. risky) as a within-Ss factor showed a main effect outcome, F(1, 200) = 
5.48, p < .020, ηp
2 
= .027. After outcomes were known, the risk-taker was judged as less 
responsible for the outcome for both positive and negative outcomes, regardless of how they 
were framed. The risk-taking investor also appeared to be more personally involved, F(1,198) 
= 52.4, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .21, regardless of outcome and framing.   
Responsible behavior (R2) and blame. As seen in Table 2, the risk-taker is judged to 
act less responsibly (R2), regardless of frame and in all three outcome conditions. A 2x2x3 
Mixed ANOVA on R2 ratings, using frame (save vs. loss), choice (certain vs. risky), and 
outcome (no outcome vs. positive outcome vs. negative outcome), showed only a main effect 
of choice, F(1, 200) = 284.4, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .587. However, as in Experiment 1, there was an 
effect of participants’ own preferences on R2 ratings. Those that preferred the certain option 
deemed the risky option to be particularly irresponsible (Mcertain = 5.91 vs. Mrisky = 3.74, t(46) 
= 10.84, p < .001, d = 1.6). Participants who chose the risky option differed much less in their 
R2 ratings of the two options (Mcertain = 5.26 vs. Mrisky = 4.74, t(22) = 1.55, p = .137, d = 0.32). 
The risk-taking protagonist was deemed more blameworthy, F(1,197) =  52.14, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .209, regardless of the outcome and frame.  
Discussion 
Decision makers who choose the risky strategy were in both frames considered more, 
rather than less responsible for the outcome, as long as the actual outcome remained unknown, 
but not in the post-outcome conditions. It is reasonable to claim that a decision maker should 
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not receive full credit for a “lucky” success (Zimmermann, 1987). Similarly, accidental 
failures may reduce responsibility by being unintended (Lagnado & Channon, 2008).  
 Outcome responsibility (R1) does not entail acting in a responsible way (R2). These 
two concepts are, despite their terminological similarity, judged in different ways. The certain 
outcome option was perceived to be the most responsible choice both in the loss framed 
version and in the gain framed version, with or without outcome knowledge. Decision makers 
choosing the risky outcome option were accordingly perceived to be more blameworthy, 
especially when incurring a loss, but also in the no-outcome and positive outcome conditions. 
The risky decision maker was also expected to feel more personally involved, confirming the 
results of Experiment 1. Thus, “embracing chance” did not in this context absolve the actor 
from outcome blame and responsibility, as claimed by Tykocinski et al. (2016). 
 Experiment 3: Saving and losing money vs. saving and losing lives 
The two scenarios used in Experiments 1 and 2 produced different patterns of 
preferences, as more participants preferred the risky option in Experiment 1 (life/death 
problem) than in Experiment 2 (financial problem). The pattern of responsibility ratings (R1 
vs. R2) was more similar. Experiment 3 explored the similarities and differences between the 
two domains by presenting both scenarios to the same participants. Results from the previous 
experiments suggested a difference between risking money and risking lives, but the two 
scenarios also differed in who would bear the consequences (self vs. other). To make the 
scenarios more comparable the financial decision makers in Experiment 3 handled a client’s 
money rather than their own. Like the ministers of health, they were not causally involved in 
how the situation arose in the first place, and did not have to bear the immediate consequences 
of their decisions.  
The previous studies indicated that a risk-taking decision maker is given the same or 
higher outcome responsibility, even when being less in control of the outcome. Causality is 
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regarded to be an integral part of outcome responsibility (Lagnado et al., 2013), although not 
the only one (Critchlow, 1985; Shaver & Drown, 1986). In some research paradigms, like in 
the egocentric bias and shared responsibility literatures (Forsyth & Kelley, 1994; Ross & 
Sicoly, 1979; Teigen & Brun, 2011), magnitude of causal contribution and degree of 
responsibility are used interchangeably. In the present experiment ratings of causal 
contribution were included to assess the relationship between causality and outcome 
responsibility.  
We believe that the concept of acting responsibly (R2) has strong normative 
connotations, reflecting the decision maker’s moral and social accountability. In addition to 
blameworthiness, Experiment 3 also included ratings of “how acceptable are the choices” and 
“which option is easier to justify”. These ratings were predicted to be higher for the certain 
option and would be positively related to R2 judgments.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 153 undergraduate students (64% women, mean age 24.2 years) 
from the University of Oslo participated as unpaid volunteers. They were randomly assigned 
to two conditions (save vs. loss frame).  
Materials and procedure. The study was conducted as a 2 x 2 mixed design, with 
frame (save vs. lose) as a between-groups, and choice (certain vs. risky outcome) as a within-
group factor. Participants were presented with two scenarios, the vaccination version of the 
AD problem used earlier, and a modified version of the financial scenario to make the two 
scenarios as similar as possible.  
 The risky and riskless strategies were described as before. Participants were first 
asked which option they preferred themselves, then told about the choices made by the two 
protagonists, as in the previous experiments. Participants were asked how acceptable they 
found the choices to be, how responsible were the decision makers for the outcome (R1), how 
15 
 
large were their contributions, how blameworthy were they, to which degree had they acted in 
a responsible way (R2), and finally, who would find it easier to give reasons for his/her choice. 
The order of R1 and R2 ratings was counterbalanced across participants. No order effect was 
found, so the ratings were pooled. Responses were assessed on 7-point scales (e.g., 1 = no 
responsibility, 7 = fully responsible), except for the last question, which was a binary choice 
between which option (the certain vs. the uncertain strategy) would be easier to explain.  
Results  
Preferences. As seen in Table 3, framing effects were observed for both scenarios, 
with the certain frame more strongly preferred in the save frame than the loss frame; 
2
(1, N = 
149) = 4.81, p = .028 for the finance scenario, and 
2
(1, N = 147) = 5.95, p = .015 for the 
vaccination scenario, respectively.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
 
Most participants felt that the certain option was easier to explain, but these answers 
were also affected by frame, as they believed it was easier to give reasons for the sure option 
in the positive than in the negative frame. Participants generally believed that the options they 
preferred themselves were easier to justify.   
 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Responsibility (R1) and causal contribution to outcome. We find again that the 
decision makers were considered quite responsible in all conditions, even when making a 
risky choice. Responsibility ratings for finance and vaccination scenarios were compared in a 
2 (Scenario: finance vs. vaccination) x 2 (Choice: certain vs. uncertain outcome) x 2 (Frame: 
loss vs. save) mixed ANOVA, with frame as the between-subjects variable. This analysis 
revealed no main effects, but an interaction effect between scenario and choice, F(1,137) = 
5.31, p < .023, ηp
2
= .04. The actor choosing the certain option was perceived slightly less 
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responsible for the outcome in the finance situation and slightly more in the vaccination 
situation.  
 A mixed ANOVA assessed the magnitude of causal contribution, showing a main 
effect of choice, F(1,138) = 6.71, p <.011, ηp
2 
= .05. The actor was perceived as more causal 
when choosing the certain outcome in both scenarios. No significant interaction of frame and 
choice was observed, nor of scenario and choice. Positive correlations were observed between 
magnitude of contribution and responsibility (R1) in all conditions and for both scenarios, 
with an average correlation (via Fisher’s r to z transformation) of r = .34. 
Responsible behavior (R2), acceptability, and blame. Decision makers choosing the 
certain outcome option were generally perceived to be acting in a more responsible way, as in 
the previous experiments. A mixed ANOVA was performed as above, but with acting 
responsibly (R2) as the dependent variable, demonstrating a main effect of choice, F(1, 140) 
= 100.06, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .42. A significant interaction of choice and scenario was also 
observed, F(1, 140) = 41.91, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15, indicating that the certain option is 
considered more responsible in the finance than in the vaccination scenario. The same pattern 
of results was observed in both framing conditions. 
R2 judgments were again related to the participants’ own preferences, with a 
significant interaction between own preference and the decision makers’ choice, both in the 
financial scenario, F(1, 145) = 22.80, p < .001, and in the vaccination scenario, F(1, 137) = 
60.76, p < .001. A closer inspection revealed in the financial scenario, both sets of participants 
found the certain option to be a more responsible choice than the risky option, but the 
difference was again bigger for participants preferring the certain option (Mcertain = 6.03 vs. 
Mrisky = 3.42, t(105) = 15.02, p < .001, d =1.49 vs. Mcertain = 5.21 vs. Mrisky =  4.28, t(42) = 
3.10, p = .003, d = 0.48 for risk preference). The vaccination scenario showed a similar 
pattern to Experiment 1 and 2, where participants preferring the certain option deemed the 
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risky option to be particularly irresponsible (Mcertain = 5.81 vs. Mrisky = 3.52, t(76) = 9.81, p 
< .001, d = 1.12). Participants preferring the risky option differed less in their R2 ratings of 
the two options (Mcertain = 4.45 vs. Mrisky = 5.00, t(63) = 1.55, p = .047, d = - 0.258). 
 Choosing the risky option was also rated to be less acceptable and more blameworthy, 
in all conditions, as shown in Table 4. An overall mixed ANOVA with acceptability as the 
dependent variable yielded a highly significant main effect of choice, F(1,143) = 63.62, p 
< .001, ηp
2
 = .31. The difference was especially pronounced in the finance situation, 
demonstrated by a significant interaction effect of scenario and choice, F(1,143) = 9.92, p 
< .002, ηp
2
  = .065. Choosing the risky option is less acceptable in the save frame than in the 
loss frame (F(1,143) = 6.24, p <.014, ηp
2
 = .04). Parallel results were obtained for 
blameworthiness.  
 The close correspondence between R2, acceptability, and blameworthiness was 
confirmed by examining the correlations between these variables. Acting responsibly (R2) 
ratings correlated positively with acceptability ratings, for both scenarios and in all conditions, 
with a mean r = .62, and negatively with blameworthiness, with a mean r = -.43 (both means 
are based on 8 correlations, averaged after Fisher’s r to z transformations).  
 To summarize, we show in Figure 1 that decision makers were in all conditions 
viewed as equally responsible for outcome, regardless of the risks taken. In contrast, risky 
decisions were viewed as much less responsible acts. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Discussion 
Framing effects were demonstrated for own choice both in the finance and in the 
vaccination scenario. The risky option was more attractive in the vaccination situation than in 
the finance scenario. Frames did also to some extent influence which decision participants 
found it easier to justify. 
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We observed again a dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings, as demonstrated in 
Figure 1. The certain choice was perceived to be a more responsible course of action (R2) in 
all conditions. It was also more acceptable, less blameworthy, and easier to justify, confirming 
the idea that acting responsibly is about “doing the right thing for the right reasons” 
(Anderson, 1995), and that making riskless choices are the normatively right thing to do, 
although less so when lives are at stake.  
To be held personally responsible (R1) for an outcome was, as expected, related to the 
magnitude of the causal contribution. This contribution was larger for the decision maker who 
chose the certain option, and yet we see again that choosing an uncertain option does not 
absolve the decision maker from outcome responsibility.  
Results from all three experiments strongly suggest that knowledge about the risks one 
is taking is sufficient to make risk-takers responsible for outcomes they cannot completely 
foresee or control.  
Experiment 4: Saving lives by uninformed and informed decision makers 
The above results appear to contradict Leonhard et al.’s (2011) and Tykocinski et al.’s 
(2016) claims that risk-taking reduces outcome responsibility of the decision maker, because 
of the chance factors involved. We found risk-takers in these studies to be rated equally or 
more responsible, perhaps because they were considered knowledgeable about the risk and 
were choosing it voluntarily. An additional study was performed to contrast informed with 
uninformed decision makers who are running the same risks without deliberately choosing 
them. Under these circumstances, responsibility might be reduced, simply because the actors 
cannot foresee the results or the amounts of risk involved.  
 The previous studies have included decision making dilemmas involving finance and 
life and death situations, framed positively and negatively, and with different outcomes, 
demonstrating comparable patterns of results. In this experiment, we use only one decision 
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problem, one frame (saving, rather than losing lives), and only one (negative) outcome of the 
risky option.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 132 undergraduate students (66 % women, mean age 22.6 
years) from the University of Oslo participated. They were randomly assigned to two 
conditions (informed vs. uninformed actors). 
Materials and procedure. Both groups were presented with the vaccination scenario, 
similarly as in the other studies. However, participants in the uninformed group were told that 
the research report describing the effect of the two vaccines was not ready at the time of the 
decision, but would be available later. Both groups were informed about the outcomes. In 
Country A 200 people were saved, as expected. In Country B none of the 600 was saved.   
Participants were asked to rate each decision maker’s responsibility for the outcome 
(R1), how acceptable was the decision, how large was the decision maker’s causal 
contribution to the outcome, and how responsible was the decision maker’s choice (R2), on 1-
7 rating scales, as before. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
Results 
Responsibility (R1) and causal contribution to outcome. A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with 
condition (between-Ss) and choice (within-Ss) as the two factors showed a main effect of 
condition, F(1,131) = 19.43, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .13, where the uninformed ministers were rated 
lower in outcome responsibility than the informed ministers. Yet, there was no effect of 
choice, F(1,131) = 1.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .01, so both ministers were judged to carry the same 
responsibility (R1) for the outcome regardless of choosing the certain option or the risky 
option. There was no interaction between condition and choice, F(1,131) = 0.19, p = .66, ηp
2
 
= .001. As seen in Table 5, the informed risk-taking minister was rated has having less causal 
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contribution to the outcome, compared to the minister who chose the certain program. Thus, 
being uninformed reduces responsibility, but taking a risk does not reduce decision makers’ 
responsibility, even if their causal contributions are reduced.  
Responsible behavior (R2) and acceptability. Table 5 indicates that the informed 
minister of health who chose the certain option made a more acceptable decision and acted in 
a more responsible way (R2) than his risk-taking colleague. This was confirmed in a 2 x 2 
mixed ANOVA with condition (between-Ss) and choice (within-Ss) as the two factors 
showed an interaction of condition and choice, F(1,130) = 11.50, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .08).  There 
was also an interaction between choice and condition for ratings of acceptability, F(1, 131) = 
6.71, p = .011, ηp
2
 = .05, showing that the informed minister of health and based on this 
knowledge chose the certain option, made a more acceptable decision. 
Discussion  
 Responsibility appeared in this experiment to be much closer related to the actors’ 
state of knowledge at the time of making the decision than to their ability of controlling the 
result. Following the distinction between internal (epistemic) uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty that 
springs from ignorance and incomplete knowledge, and external (aleatory) uncertainty, which 
depends on outcome variability due to random processes in the outside world (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982), we might conclude that responsibility judgments are more influenced by 
internal uncertainty than of external uncertainty. In line with this we often hear accountable 
decision makers, like politicians and CEO of companies, excuse themselves from 
responsibility by declaring themselves uninformed. They rarely say they have no 
responsibility because they left the outcome to chance, as they may intuitively realize that 
such behavior would be blameworthy and make them appear as “negligent” or irresponsible 
decision makers. Choosing the risky option will at best only reduce one’s own feeling of 
responsibility, not the overall responsibility as perceived by an external judge. 
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General Discussion 
 The present set of studies investigated whether judgments of responsibility differ 
between certain and risky options, distinguishing between responsibility for the outcome (R1) 
and acting responsibly (R2). Participants were asked to compare decision makers who had 
chosen the certain and the risky options in two domains, and to assess their perceived degree 
of responsibility and other related concepts. In Experiment 1, R1 and R2 ratings were 
performed by different participants (between-Ss design), whereas in Experiment 2-4, both 
ratings were performed by the same individuals (within-Ss designs). Potential framing effects 
were studied in Experiment 1, 2, and 3 (as between-Ss factors). Experiment 2 also included 
post-outcome conditions, allowing participants to rate the decision makers´ responsibilities 
after the outcome of their choices were known. Experiment 4 differed from the other studies 
by comparing informed with uninformed decision-makers, who at the time of the decision 
lack knowledge of the risks involved.  
In all four experiments, ratings of outcome responsibility (R1) were quite high in all 
conditions. Those who chose the risky option were not excused from responsibility, despite 
being less in control and making a smaller causal contribution, which are two of the key 
premises for being held responsible (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Hart, 2008; Heider, 1958; 
Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). Besides, the risky decision was an informed choice and freely 
chosen, leaving both potential outcomes foreseeable and known.  
 Choosing the certain program was, as predicted, generally regarded as the most 
responsible thing to do (R2). In line with this, it was also regarded as a more acceptable and 
less blameworthy choice, and easier to justify than the risky option. Risky decision makers 
were, however, viewed as more involved, suggesting that risk-taking is a norm violating 
action, which comes with a personal cost for the decision maker (Nichols, 2002).  
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We thus observed a difference between R1 and R2 judgments, confirming an 
important distinction introduced by Nordbye and Teigen (2014a) between responsibility for 
outcomes and responsible acts. Despite the similarity in terms, having the responsibility for an 
outcome (R1) and behaving in a responsible way (R2) involve two different interpretations of 
responsibility. A “responsible” (R2) decision maker will behave according to social 
obligations, professional requirements, and moral maxims like “be considerate” and “do not 
expose others to harm”. Role expectations may require that “responsible” leaders also accept 
outcome responsibility (R1) for events that they did not actively produce, but allowed to 
happen (or perhaps “should have foreseen”).  
Responsibility aversion   
It has been suggested that choosing the risky option in the loss frame is a way of 
strategically managing impression formation in order to avoid blame (Leonhardt et al., 2011; 
Tykocinski et al., 2016). We were not able to confirm previous findings of lower “risk of 
responsibility” and less blame for the risk-taker in the AD paradigm. Overall, we find that 
decisions leaving parts of the outcome to chance give decision makers equal or even more, 
rather than less, outcome responsibility, making risk a poor strategy for evading responsibility. 
Risky decisions may draw attention to the actors’ freedom of choice, accompanied by a 
heightened sense of personal agency, which in turn increases responsibility attributions 
(Lagnado et al., 2013). In choosing the risky option, the decision maker is pivotal in affecting 
the outcome, thus implying outcome responsibility, despite the uncertainties involved. 
In our experiments, participants were asked to judge the responsibility of the decision 
makers as seen from an external perspective (how responsible is the decision maker for the 
outcome), whereas Leonhardt et al. (2011) asked how the participants themselves would have 
felt about the choice. To check the effect of perspective, we ran an additional control study, 
where participants (N = 194) received the positively framed versions of both scenarios either 
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formulated in objective terms: “who is more responsible”, or in terms of the decision makers’ 
subjective feelings: “who will feel more responsible”. However, these divergent formulations 
did not make a difference. Risk takers in both groups were found to have more outcome 
responsibility than those who chose the riskless option. Some of Leonhardt’s (2011) studies 
involved loss-loss situations. In such situations, a negative outcome (e.g., a town will be hit 
by a stray missile) will occur regardless of the decision maker’s actions. In such cases, feeling 
better about an uncertain option (the town hit by the missile is random) compared to the 
certain option (you decide which town will be hit by the missile), might reflect decision 
aversion (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994) rather than responsibility aversion.    
A reduction in outcome responsibility (R1) was only found for uninformed decision 
makers (Experiment 4). Pleading lack of knowledge may be a way for accountable decision 
makers to excuse themselves from responsibility, however, trying to evade responsibility by 
leaving the outcome up to chance does not seem to lead to absolution. On the contrary, it can 
backfire by being regarded as irresponsible and blameworthy behaviors.  
Across all experiments the risky choice was judged to be less responsible. R2 
judgments were also related to participants’ preferences. Participants who preferred the 
certain option, rated the risky option as substantially less responsible than the certain option, 
while participants preferring the risky option differed comparatively little in their R2 ratings 
of the two options. The present findings therefore suggest a somewhat different story: a 
decision maker who chooses the risky option will be judged rather harshly by people who 
themselves prefer the certain option, while people preferring the risky option will find the 
decision to be equally responsible (R2) as choosing the certain option. A similar pattern was 
also found for blame ratings, indicating that the certain option may often be the “safest” 
option. A moral echoing effect has recently been suggested, where peoples’ judgments of 
moral responsibility seem to echo their framing preferences in the classical AD task 
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(Parkinson & Byrne, 2017). Though moral responsibility is not synonymous to acting 
responsibly (one can be morally responsible for outcomes, not just acts), Parkinson and 
Byrne’s findings are compatible with ours.  
The effect of preference on responsibility (R2) ratings also indicates that riskless 
choices are not in and by themselves more responsible, they are responsible decisions only if 
decision makers think they are wise. Thus, risk-takers were viewed as behaving more 
responsibly in matters of life and death (trying to save all and lose none) than in a financial 
dilemma, where saving at least some of the money seem better than risking it all. Taken 
together, the findings suggest that decision makers seeking to manage others’ opinions of 
them and their decisions, should carefully examine both the nature and domain of the choices 
they make. 
Responsibility and related concepts 
Another possible reason for the diverging findings may be sought in the 
operationalizations of the concept of responsibility (for a discussion, see Nordbye, 2015). 
Even though the present studies found the risky choice to involve less control and less 
contribution to the outcome, we did not find a reduction in responsibility or blame. 
Responsibility has long been recognized as an ambiguous concept (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; 
Hamilton & Sanders, 1981; Hart, 2008; Sousa, 2009). Both the scientific and everyday use of 
the term is prone to idiosyncratic differences (e.g., Malle et al., 2014). For example, 
attribution literature often equates responsibility either with causality (e.g., Harvey & Rule, 
1978; Lagnado et al., 2013), or with blame (e.g., Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981). The 
present research confirms that these concepts are related to two quite different aspects of the 
responsibility compound. Moreover, blameworthiness can be directed toward the action (as in 
R2) or outcome (as in R1). In Leonhardt et al.’s study, participants (between-Ss) were asked 
how strongly the outcome would make them feel accountable, how guilty they would feel, 
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and how much they would blame themselves (the term responsibility was not used). But the 
outcomes were not disclosed, and some participants in the “Uncertain” condition might well 
have thought that the program had been successful and nobody died. With such a lucky 
outcome, they would have little reason for blaming themselves.  
Responsibility is not just essential for blaming others, it is also crucial when it comes 
to blaming oneself.  Self-blame is an essential component of regret, and it has been suggested 
that responsibility is a precondition for regret (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). In 
their decision justification theory, Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) distinguish between 
process regret (self-blame for having made a poor choice) and outcome regret (associated 
with having obtained a comparatively poor outcome). Evidently the first kind of regret 
pertains to the act of choosing, irrespective of outcome, and is accordingly related to having 
acted in a less responsible way (R2 in our terminology).  A study relating these two facets of 
regret to the two kinds of responsibility judgment discussed in the present work might provide 
additional insights in the assessment of decision making under uncertainty.  
The distinction between a focus on process and a focus on outcome is central in 
several related fields. Within the management literature, studies have investigated the effects 
of holding decision makers accountable for the quality of their efforts (process accountability) 
or for their effectiveness in actually delivering outcomes (outcome accountability) (for an 
overview, see Patil, Vieider, & Tetlock, 2014). The distinction bears resemblance to the two 
responsibility concepts discussed in the present paper. However, different forms of 
accountability are typically seen as situational characteristics that can be manipulated by an 
experimenter to induce various behavioral effects. For instance, an emphasis on procedural 
accountability has been found to encourage a more thorough evaluation of available 
information, whereas focus on outcome accountability may hamper judgments (Siegel-Jacobs 
& Yates, 1996). In contrast, the present studies have compared how decision makers’ 
26 
 
responsibilities for their actions and outcomes will be evaluated. Future studies should 
investigate whether outcome accountable managers also will be judged more responsible for 
outcomes (R1), and, correspondingly, whether actors who are held process accountable will 
be evaluated as behaving in a more responsible way (R2).    
Responsibility and framing 
While the classical framing effects were replicated in participants’ preferences, which 
in turn affected ratings of acting responsibly (R2) and blameworthiness, both frames produced 
rather similar response patterns for ratings of responsibility, personal involvement, and causal 
contribution, indicating that the different evaluations of the risky and the riskless option are 
robust and not uniquely dependent on one particular frame or one particular domain. The 
studies of Tykocinski et al. (2016) demonstrate that degree of responsibility can amplify the 
framing effect. Under high responsibility, more people choose the risky options when framed 
as losses rather than as gains. But it does not follow that choice of risky option will reduce 
responsibility. What they show is that responsibility affects some choices, which, however, 
does not imply that other choices will take responsibility away. Thus, we do not dispute 
Tykocinski’s data, but disagree with the conclusions they draw.   
Framing effects of responsibility judgments have previously been observed for 
opponents competing for the world championship in chess (Nordbye & Teigen, 2014b), but 
this study focused on causal responsibility and did not involve risks or moral evaluations. 
Moreover, it may be easier to transfer the responsibility from one actor to another, as in the 
chess study, than from one human decision maker to the arbitrary interventions of good and 
bad luck. After all, responsibility is a human prerogative and not easily taken over by chance.  
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Table 1. Mean ratings (SD) for certain and risky options in four conditions of the vaccination 
scenario, Experiment 1 
 Condition 1 (R1)  Condition 2 (R2) 
 Positive frame  Negative frame  Positive frame  Negative frame 
 Certain Risky  Certain Risky  Certain Risky  Certain Risky 
Responsibility 1 4.63 4.60  4.90 4.65  - -  - - 
(SD) (1.63) (1.67)  (1.25) (1.36)  - -  - - 
Involvement 4.20 5.17*  4.35 5.10*  4.74 4.98  3.84 4.98** 
(SD) (1.75) (1.37)  (1.33) (1.42)  (1.53) (1.58)  (1.60) (1.39) 
Responsibility 2 - -  - -  5.00 3.90**  4.37 4.30 
(SD) - -  - -  (1.41) (1.41)  (1.32) (1.45) 
Blame 3.57 3.73  4.03 3.71  3.26 3.69  3.73 3.62 
(SD) (1.57) (1.70)  (1.68) (1.72)  (1.50) (1.62)  (1.62) (1.66) 
*p < .05; **p < .01 (t-tests for paired samples, comparing ratings of certain vs. risk-seeking 
decision makers) 
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Table 2. Mean ratings (SD) for certain and risky options in three outcome conditions of 
positively and negatively framed versions of the finance scenario, Experiment 2 
 Positive frame  Negative frame 
Ratings Certain Risky t  Certain Risky t 
Pre-outcome condition        
  Responsibility 1 5.00 5.56 -1.46  4.68 5.24 -2.14* 
  (SD) (1.79) (1.28)   (1.68) (1.44)  
  Involvement    4.64 6.24 -5.45***  4.68 5.80 -3.10** 
  (SD) (1.43) (0.97)   (1.32) (1.45)  
  Responsibility 2 5.82 4.09 5.74***  5.58 4.06 5.95*** 
  (SD) (1.09) (1.33)   (1.16) (1.22)  
  Blameworthy 2.45 3.90 -4.90***  3.17 4.17 -3.30*** 
  (SD) (1.46) (1.94)   (1.68) (1.63)  
Post-outcome conditions        
Positive outcome of risky program       
  Responsibility 1 4.53 4.82 -0.85  4.79 3.85 2.77** 
  (SD) (1.78) (1.93)   (1.85) (1.80)  
  Involvement  5.03 5.97 -3.09**  4.82 5.55 -1.80 
  (SD) (1.24) (1.11)   (1.45) (1.33)  
  Responsibility 2 5.94 3.71 8.70***  5.45 3.94 6.57*** 
  (SD) (0.74) (1.17)   (1.06) (1.30)  
  Blameworthy 2.88 4.03 -3.07**  3.36 3.55 -0.67 
  (SD) (1.79) (1.77)   (1.73) (1.77)  
Negative outcome of risky program       
  Responsibility 1 5.03 4.74 0.69  4.44 4.76 -0.86 
  (SD) (1.92) (1.96)   (2.03) (1.58)  
  Involvement  4.71 5.74 -3.25**  4.71 5.44 -1.90 
  (SD) (1.51) (1.04)   (1.17) (1.52)  
  Responsibility 2 5.97 3.77 8.85***  5.65 3.65 6.22*** 
  (SD) (0.92) (1.17)   (0.98) (1.35)  
  Blameworthy 3.11 4.20 -2.95**  3.15 4.15 -2.87** 
  (SD) (1.51) (1.64)   (1.76) (1.52)  
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 (paired samples t-tests) 
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Table 3. Percentage of participants in both frames preferring the two options, and judgements 
of which option is the easiest to explain for each scenario, Experiment 3 
 Save frame Loss frame 
 
Certain Risky Certain Risky 
Finance scenario     
Preference 79.5% 20.5% 63.2% 36.8% 
Easiest to explain 93.0% 7.0% 84.2% 15.8% 
Vaccination scenario     
Preference 64.8% 35.2% 44.7% 55.3% 
Easiest to explain   76.5% 23.5% 58.9% 41.1% 
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Table 4. Mean ratings (SD) for certain and risky options for saving and losing money (upper 
panel) and saving and losing lives (lower panel), Experiment 3 
 Positive frame  Negative frame 
Ratings Certain Risky t  Certain Risky t 
Finance scenario        
  Responsibility 1 4.97 5.29 -1.88  5.09 5.20 -0.44 
  (SD) (1.68) (1.52)   (1.75) (1.50)  
  Causal contribution 4.71 4.17 1.82  4.96 4.38 2.20* 
   (SD) (1.76) (1.60)   (1.67) (1.39)  
  Responsibility 2 5.97 3.66 10.38***  5.57 3.68 7.99*** 
   (SD) (1.18) (1.28)   (1.40) (1.38)  
  Acceptability 5.83 4.04 8.97***  5.23 4.17 4.88*** 
   (SD) (1.14) (1.38)   (1.37) (1.33)  
  Blame 2.88 4.79 -8.28***  3.53 4.43 -3.76*** 
   (SD) (1.42) (1.51)   (1.64) (1.42)  
Vaccination scenario        
  Responsibility 1 5.21 5.07 0.52  5.26 4.89 1.58 
   (SD) (1.67) (1.85)   (1.67) (1.68)  
  Causal contribution 4.60 4.37 0.90  4.93 4.55 1.41 
   (SD) (1.88) (1.75)   (1.78) (1.44)  
  Responsibility 2 5.38 4.14 4.00***  5.01 4.21 2.78** 
   (SD) (1.49) (1.56)   (1.64) (1.41)  
  Acceptability 5.01 3.87 3.88***  4.88 4.41 1.81 
   (SD) (1.55) (1.58)   (1.69) (1.49)  
  Blame 3.61 4.80 -4.16***  3.75 4.42 -2.49* 
   (SD) (1.73) (1.56)   (1.57) (1.39)  
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 (paired samples t-tests) 
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Table 5. Mean ratings of certain and risky options for saving lives for informed and 
uninformed decision makers, Experiment 4 
 
 Uninformed decision makers  Informed decision makers 
 Certain Risky t  Certain Risky t 
Responsibility 1 3.82 3.59 1.26  4.93 4.82 .49 
(SD) (1.81) (1.74)   (1.65) (1.72)  
Causal contribution 4.33 4.08 .56  4.72 3.94 3.27* 
(SD) (1.92) (1.79)   (1.77) (1.82)  
Responsibility 2 4.79 4.80 .48  5.39 4.30 5.09*** 
(SD) (1.61) (1.60)   (1.04) (1.28)  
Acceptability 5.03 5.11 -.37  5.33 4.70 3.49** 
(SD) (1.31) (1.43)   (1.72) (1.53)  
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 (paired samples t-tests) 
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Figure legend 
Figure 1. Mean responsibility judgments with standard errors for decision makers choosing 
certain and risky options, in two positively and negatively framed risky choice scenarios, 
Experiment 3. 
 
 
